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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The Idaho Supreme Court remanded this case after holding the initial order for restitution
was not supported by the requisite substantial evidence.  On remand, the district court erred by
entering a new restitution award which was based on essentially the same insufficient “evidence”
as its initial order.
Specifically, the district court relied on a document which purported to reveal the amount
of time each attorney worked on the case even though the entries in that document were not
sworn or certified true by the people making the entries.  In fact, the district court erred by
allowing that document, as well as a second document, into evidence in the first place because
they had both been prepared by the prosecutor’s office in anticipation of the restitution
proceedings, which the Idaho Supreme Court has clearly held makes them inadmissible under the
hearsay rules.  Finally, the State did not provide the number it was using for the prosecutors’
actual pay rates.  Thus, there was no evidence to show its calculated total represented its actual
loss.  That lack of evidence is especially troubling since the total it requested indicates the
numbers it was using for the prosecutors’ pay rates were improperly inflated.
Since the district court made the same error it did the last time around, this Court should
vacate the order of restitution again.  However, as the State has now had two opportunities to try
to prove its actual loss, and has failed both times, this Court should not remand the case to give
the State a third bite at the apple.
2Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Jeremy Cunningham was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance by a jury.
(42585 R., p.87.)1  In subsequent restitution proceedings, the prosecutor presented an unsworn
Statement of Costs which requested $2,240 in restitution for prosecution costs for 16 hours
worked at a pay rate of $140 per hour.  (42585 Exh., p.7; see also 42585 Tr., p.4, Ls.17-21.)
Mr. Cunningham objected to that request for restitution, arguing, for example, that the requested
rate of pay did not reflect the prosecutor’s regular salary.  (42585 Tr., p.7, L.11 - p.8, L.21.)  The
district court rejected his arguments and ordered him to pay restitution per the prosecutor’s
representations.2  (42585 Tr., p.8, L.22 - p.10, L.19; 42585 R., pp.98-99.)  Mr. Cunningham
timely appealed.  (See 42585 R., p.92.)
In that appeal, Mr. Cunningham argued the district court had erred in ordering that
restitution because there was not substantial evidence to support the order.  The Idaho Supreme
Court agreed. State v. Cunningham, 161 Idaho 698 (2017).  It expressly held that “unsworn
representations, even by an officer of the court, do not constitute ‘substantial evidence’ upon
which restitution under section 37-2732(k) may be based.” Id. at 702.  Thus, it explained a form
prepared by the prosecutor which merely lists the total hours worked, the applicable pay rate, and
calculates a sum total, but which does not provide certified accountings for either number, does
not meet the State’s burden of proof. Id. at 700.
1 The Idaho Supreme Court ordered the record in this case be supplemented with the record,
exhibits, and transcripts prepared in Mr. Cunningham’s previous appeal, Docket Number 42585.
(R., p.2.)  References to the documents from that record will be identified with the docket
number.  For example, a citation to that record will be cited as “42585 R.”
2 The district court also ordered $100 in restitution for the lab testing to which Mr. Cunningham
did not object.  (See 42585 R., p.99; 42585 Tr., p.6, Ls.13-16.)
3The Supreme Court also provided guidance for the ensuing remand.  Specifically, it noted
that I.C. § 37-2732(k), “by its plain terms, grants discretion to award restitution to the State for
prosecution expenses ‘actually incurred.’” Id. (emphasis from original).  That meant, the Court
explained, that the restitution award could not be based on a determination of “reasonable”
attorney fees, but rather, the expenses actually incurred as a result of this case. Id.  To that point,
it noted the “burden to prove expenses actually incurred will generally require sworn statements
that delineate the time spent performing specific tasks” at a minimum. Id.
On remand, the district court held a new restitution hearing.  The State presented one
witness at that hearing – Kylie Bolland, an administrative assistant in the prosecutor’s office who
collected various information to calculate the amount of restitution to be requested.  (See
generally Tr.)  Specifically, she relied on “the purple sheet,” on which various prosecutors
purportedly indicated the amount of time they had each spent on various tasks associated with
the case.  (Tr., p.4, L.12 - p.6, L.4; see Exh., p.2.)  There is no indication on the purple sheet that
the entries therein are certified accurate.  (See generally Exh., p.2.)
Mr. Cunningham objected to Ms. Bolland’s testimony based on the purple sheet, as well
as the purple sheet itself, arguing that the State had not laid foundation as to Ms. Bolland’s
knowledge about the accuracy of the information contained in the purple sheet.  (Tr., p.6,
Ls.11-14.)  The prosecutor requested leave to inquire further, and Ms. Bolland testified that the
purple sheet is a record kept by the prosecutor’s office in all such cases.  (Tr., p.7, Ls.1-6.)
Mr. Cunningham renewed his objection.  (Tr., p.7, Ls.12-13.)  The district court overruled that
objection, admitting the purple sheet under I.R.E. 803(6) as a business record.  (Tr., p.7,
Ls.14-22.)
4Ms. Bolland proceeded to testify that, using the numbers from the purple sheet, and
looking up the pay rates for the various prosecutors, she had “do[ne] that math” to calculate the
amount of restitution to request in this case.  (Tr., p.8, L.9 - p.12, L.1.)  During that testimony,
the State sought to have Ms. Bolland’s affidavit to that effect admitted as evidence.  (Tr., p.9,
Ls.5-24; see Exh., pp.3-4.)  Mr. Cunningham raised the same objection he had made to the
purple sheet.  (Tr., p.10, Ls.1-4.)  The district court reviewed the affidavit and concluded it was
not a self-authenticating document as to the payroll records themselves, as Ms. Bolland did not
purport to be the custodian of those records.  (Tr., p.10, Ls.14-25.)  However, it ultimately
allowed her to testify about her interaction with the payroll records as business records under
I.R.E. 803(6) and admitted her affidavit under the same rule.  (Tr., p.11, Ls.1-10.)  Ms. Bolland
never identified what numbers she was using for the pay rates in her calculations.  (See generally
Tr.)  However, she testified that, by her calculations, the total restitution to be requested in this
case was $906.75.  (Tr., p.11, L.24 - p.12, L.1.)
Mr. Cunningham argued the State had failed to meet its burden of proof for several
reasons.   For  example,  he  argued  that  Ms.  Bolland’s  affidavit  was  essentially  the  same  as  the
Statement of Costs the State had used at the first restitution hearing.  (Tr., p.13, Ls.15-16.)  He
also pointed out that the State had not presented any evidence as to what the prosecutors’ regular
salaries actually were.  (Tr., p.13, Ls.16-17.)  He added that, without that information, the State
had failed to show that Ms. Bolland’s calculations were based on the prosecutors’ regular
salaries,  that  they  were  not  improperly  inflated  by  benefits,  bonuses,  or  other  additional  costs.
(Tr., p.13, L.17 - p.14, L.5.)  He also argued that the entries in the purple sheet was not sworn,
and that there was no other evidence to show that those entries were, in fact, accurate
representations of the time worked.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.6-12.)
5The  district  court  rejected  those  arguments,  concluding  that,  since  Ms.  Bolland  was
testifying under oath, her testimony, based on the documents offered, was sufficient to meet the
Supreme Court’s instructions and guidance for remand.  (Tr., p.16, L.4 - p.17, L.4.)  As such, it
entered a new order for restitution in the amount of $906.75 and amended the judgment to reflect
the new restitution order.  (Tr., p.18, Ls.5-7; R., p.26-28, 33-34.)
Mr. Cunningham filed a notice of appeal timely from the amended judgment of
conviction.  (R., pp.30-31.)
6ISSUE
Whether the district court’s decision to award restitution after the Idaho Supreme Court
remanded this case is still unsupported by the requisite substantial evidence.
7ARGUMENT
The District Court’s Decision To Award Restitution After The Idaho Supreme Court Remanded
This Case Is Still Unsupported By The Requisite Substantial Evidence
A. Standards Of Review
The trial court’s decision to admit evidence under a hearsay exception is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Fair, 156 Idaho 431, 433 (Ct. App. 2014).  Similarly, the district
court’s decision to order restitution under I.C. § 37-2732(k) is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. See State v. Nelson, 161 Idaho 692, 695 (2017).  A district court abuses its discretion
when it  (1)  fails  to  appreciate  the  issue  as  one  of  discretion,  (2)  acts  beyond the  bounds  of  its
discretion or inconsistent with the applicable legal standards, or (3) reaches its discretion without
exercising reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
In  this  case,  the  district  court’s  decisions  to  admit  the  purple  sheet  and  Ms.  Bolland’s
affidavit were both inconsistent with the applicable legal standards, thus failing the second prong
of the Hedger test.  Its decision to award restitution for the costs of prosecution fails under that
same prong, as it is also inconsistent with the applicable legal standards, most notably the Idaho
Supreme Court’s opinion in the initial appeal in this case.
B. The  District  Court  Erred  By  Admitting  The  Purple  Sheet  And  Ms.  Bolland’s  Affidavit
Under The Business Records Exception To The Hearsay Rule Because They Were Both
Prepared In Anticipation Of Litigation
Statements made out of court are considered hearsay and are not admissible for the truth
of the matter asserted unless they fall under one of the specifically-delineated exceptions to the
hearsay rule.  I.R.E. 801, 802.  Since the State is the proponent of all the evidence in this case, it
bears the burden of proving the proffered evidence fits under one of those exceptions. Fair, 156
Idaho at 434.  The purple sheet and Ms. Bolland’s affidavit were both prepared out of court.
8(See Exh., pp.2-4.)  As such, both would have to fall under one of the hearsay exceptions to be
admissible.3  Additionally, Ms. Bolland’s testimony based on those documents would be
improper  if  the  documents  themselves  were  not  admissible  under  those  rules. See I.R.E. 805
(addressing hearsay within hearsay).
The district court admitted the purple sheet and Ms. Bolland’s affidavit under the
business records exception.  (Tr., p.7, Ls.14-22, p.11, Ls.1-10.)  That exception allows
documents to be admitted if they keep track of a businesses’ records, data, and the like, provided
those records are kept in the ordinary course of business.  I.R.E. 803(6).  However, the Idaho
Supreme Court has made it clear that the business records exception does not apply to documents
which were prepared by a public office or agency in anticipation of litigation. State v. Sandoval-
Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 911-12 (2003).  The reason for that, the Supreme Court explained, was
because the business records exception had to be interpreted alongside the public records
exception contained in I.R.E. 803(8). Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho at 912.  The public records
3 Idaho Rule of Evidence 101(d)(7) provides that the rules of evidence apply in restitution
hearings except as provided in I.C. § 19-5304(6).  That code section allows a district court in
traditional restitution proceedings to consider limited hearsay evidence “as may be contained in
the presentence report, victim impact statement or otherwise provided to the court.”  I.C. § 19-
5304(6).  Nothing in that code section purports to extend that limited exemption to restitution
proceedings under I.C. § 37-2732(k). See generally I.C. § 19-5304(6).  It does appear that
Idaho’s courts have ever extended the exception from I.C. § 19-5304(6) in that manner, nor did
the State make an argument that it should in response to Mr. Cunningham’s hearsay objections
below.  (See generally R., Tr.)
In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, the plain language of I.C. § 37-2732(k)
does not permit the State to use unsworn statements of the kind found in the purple sheet to
support a claim for restitution under that code section. Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 702.  As such,
extending the exception in I.C. § 19-5304(6) beyond the traditional restitution scenario it
specifically addresses would be contradictory to the plain language of I.C. § 37-2732(k). See
also Local 1494 of Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Couer d’Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 639-40
(1978) (explaining that, when a statute lists certain things, it excludes other dissimilar things
from its scope).  Therefore, the applicability of the hearsay rules in this case is governed by
I.R.E. 101(d)(7), under which, the hearsay rules apply.
9exception allows reports, data, and the like, from a public office or agency to be admitted if they
set forth its regularly-conducted and recorded activities.  I.R.E. 803(8).  However, that rule
expressly excludes documents prepared in anticipation of litigation from the scope of that
exception.  I.R.E. 803(8)(B) (“The following are not within this exception to the hearsay rule: . . .
investigative reports prepared by or for a government, a public office or an agency when offered
by it in a case in which it is a party.”).
The Idaho Supreme Court held that “[t]he effect of exclusion under 803(8) would be
meaningless if the report were admissible under the 803(6) business records exception.”
Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 912; accord State v. Griffith, 144 Idaho 356, 364 (Ct. App. 2007)
(assuming that admitting a public agency’s report prepared for trial under the business records
exception was error, but finding that error ultimately harmless).  Essentially, a record is not
prepared in the ordinary course of business if it is prepared in anticipation of litigation, even if
such records are made in every case the agency deals with. See Portfolio Recovery Associates,
LLC v. MacDonald, 162 Idaho 228, ___, 395 P.3d 1261, 1266 (2017) (reiterating that “[t]he
general requirement for admission under I.R.E. 803(6) is that the document be produced in the
ordinary course of business, at or near the time of occurrence and not in anticipation of trial”)
(internal quotation omitted, emphasis added).  Thus, admitting a document as a business record
when that document would be inadmissible under the public records exception is error.
Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho at 912.
Ms. Bolland’s affidavit was explicitly prepared by the prosecutor’s office, which is a
public office or agency, in preparation for the restitution proceedings.  (Tr., p.4, L.12 - p.5, L.2,
p.9, Ls.2-22; see generally Exh., pp.3-4.)  Therefore, it was inadmissible under I.R.E. 803(8)(B).
The purple sheet was also explicitly prepared in preparation for the restitution proceedings by the
10
prosecutor’s office.  (Tr., p.4, L.10 - p.5, L.2, p.7, Ls.4-6; see generally Exh., p.2.)  Therefore, it,
too, was inadmissible under I.R.E. 803(8)(B).  As a result, the district court erred by overruling
Mr. Cunningham’s objections to those documents and admitting them under I.R.E. 803(6).
See Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 912.  Because those documents were inadmissible hearsay, the
district court also erred by overruling Mr. Cunningham’s objection to Ms. Bolland’s testimony
based on those documents.   I.R.E. 805.
The fact that those documents were not admissible is particularly important in this case
because the purple sheet was the only source of information the State presented to try to prove
the  amount  of  time  the  prosecutors  worked  on  this  case.   (See generally R.,  Tr.)   Since  there
needs to be, at a minimum, sworn statements which delineate the time spent performing specific
tasks in order to meet the substantial evidence threshold, Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 702, the lack
of  any  admissible  evidence  on  that  point  means  the  district  court’s  order  for  restitution  is
contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court’s instructions in its previous opinion in this case.  As such,
the district court’s order for restitution should be vacated.
C. Even  If  The  Purple  Sheet  Was  Admissible  Evidence,  It  Does  Not  Constitute  The
Requisite “Substantial Evidence” Under The Idaho Supreme Court’s Clear Holding In
This  Case  Because  The  Entries  Therein  Were  Not  Sworn  Or  Certified  True  By  The
Person Making The Entry
The Idaho Supreme Court was clear in its previous opinion in this case about what does
and does not constitute substantial evidence in regard to a restitution award:  “We therefore hold
that the unsworn representations, even by an officer of the court, do not constitute ‘substantial
evidence’ upon which restitution under section 37-2732(k) may be based.” Cunningham, 161
Idaho at 702.  The Supreme Court was particularly critical of the State’s attempt to rely on the
11
prosecutor simply taking unverified numbers and plugging them into a math formula without
also providing evidence that the numbers were, themselves, accurate:
The statement of costs merely identifies the defendant, the case number and the
prosecutor, then it states the total number of attorney hours, the hourly rate, and
computes the sum total  of the request.   It  does not contain itemized time entries
explaining the tasks performed or the expenditures made in the particular case.
Although it is signed, the signature does not purport to certify it as correct.
Id. at 700.
When such statements are not sworn or otherwise certified to be true under the penalty of
perjury, they are not equivalent to testimony offered under oath at the hearing, and so, do not
constitute “evidence.” See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Power v. Jensen, 154 Idaho 549, 552 (2012);
see also I.C. § 9-1406 (allowing certified declarations to substitute for affidavits if they conform
to certain requirements, none of which are present in the purple sheet).  Simply put, “[u]nsworn
statements are entitled to no probative weight.” Camp v. Jimenez, 107 Idaho 878, 882 (Ct. App.
1984).  Thus, all the court has to consider when such statements are not sworn or certified are the
bare, conclusory allegations of a party in the case, and those are not enough to create a genuine
issue of material fact, much less entitle the party to the relief they seek. Rocky Mountain Power,
154 Idaho at 552; Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 236 (2008).  As a result, “the prosecutor’s
unsupported representations cannot be relied upon as evidence . . . even under the low
evidentiary standards” which exist in restitution proceedings.” State v. Cheeney, 144 Idaho 294,
299 (Ct. App. 2007).
Furthermore, the State cannot transform such statements into evidence by having
someone else testify about the document.  “[A]ffidavits of counsel based upon hearsay rather
than upon personal knowledge are insufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact.” Camp,
107 Idaho at 882.  That is why the prosecutor cannot simply compile the numbers and testify to
12
the accuracy of the compilation without an independent certification of the accuracy of the
numbers from the person with knowledge of the accuracy of those numbers. Cunningham, 161
Idaho at 702; Nelson, 161 Idaho at 697.
Yet that is exactly what the State did by presenting Ms. Bolland’s affidavit and
testimony.  She could only testify to taking the numbers from the purple sheet, as she had no
independent basis to verify the accuracy of those numbers herself.  (See Tr., p.4, L.12 - p.6, L.4.)
The mere fact that the attorney had to approve the entry is not enough. Cunningham, 161 Idaho
at 702; Camp, 107 Idaho at 882.  Thus, just like the statement of costs which the Supreme Court
criticized in the first appeal, Ms. Bolland’s testimony was simply that she had taken the
unverified numbers and calculated the sum total to request based on those numbers.  (See
Tr., p.4, L.12 - p.5, L.2.)
Essentially, the only difference between the State’s evidence on remand and its evidence
at the initial hearing is that Ms. Bolland, rather than the prosecutor, prepared the document and
made the calculations.  (Compare Tr., p.4, L.12 - p.5, L.2, and Exh., pp.3-4, with 42585 Tr., p.4,
Ls.17-21, and 42585 Exh., p.7.)  The accuracy of the numbers being used still has not been
averred or certified, as the Idaho Supreme Court expressly required. Cunningham, 161 Idaho at
702.  Thus, the “evidence” on which the district court relied on remand is the same “evidence” it
improperly used the first time.
The district court’s reliance on the same, uncertified information it had improperly used
the first time is particularly troubling since, besides clearly holding that sort of evidence is not
sufficient to justify a restitution award, the Supreme Court gave an affirmative example of what
would be sufficient in its discussion of State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167 (Ct. App. 2014). See
Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 701.  In Weaver, the prosecutor provided a certified accounting which
13
listed  both  an  itemized  description  of  the  time  spent  and  the  applicable  hourly  rate,  for  the
district court’s consideration. See id. (noting that the defendant in Weaver had not challenged
the  propriety  of  the  rate  of  pay).   But  rather  than  follow  the  example  given  by  the  Supreme
Court, the district court in this case chose to rely on uncertified information, and it did not even
require  the  State  to  provide  the  actual  numbers  it  was  using  for  the  pay  rates.   (See Exh., p.2
(providing spaces specifically for listing those pay rates, but which are blank); see generally Tr.)
Basically,  the  district  court  ordered  restitution  based  only  on  Ms.  Bolland’s  testimony
that she accurately took the unverified numbers from the purple sheet, applied a number from the
payroll  records  which  she  did  not  provide  to  the  district  court,  and  calculated  a  sum  total.
(Tr., p.4, L.12 - p.5, L.2)  That is precisely what the Idaho Supreme Court said it could not do.
Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 700-02.  Since the district court ignored the Supreme Court’s
instructions and made the same error it did the last time, this Court should vacate its order for
restitution again.
D. The State Has Presented No Evidence As To What The Prosecutors’ Actual Rates Of Pay
Were, And So, There Is Not Substantial Evidence Showing That The Amount Awarded
Represents The State’s “Actual Loss” Under I.C. § 37-2732(k)
Although Ms. Bolland testified she got the prosecutors’ rates of pay from the payroll
records, there is no indication in her testimony or the exhibits as to what those numbers actually
were.  (See generally Tr., Exh.)  In the first place, the district court concluded Ms. Bolland was
not the keeper of the payroll records, and so, could not inherently verify the accuracy of those
records.  (Tr., p.10, Ls.14-25.)  As such, there was no admissible evidence as to what the
prosecutors’ pay rates were, since Ms. Bolland’s bare assertion about her calculations is not
substantial evidence of the prosecutor’s pay rates. See Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 702 (“unsworn
representation, even by an officer of the court, do not constitute ‘substantial evidence’ upon
14
which restitution under section 37-2732(k) may be based”); Camp, 107 Idaho at 882 (“affidavits
of counsel based upon hearsay rather than upon personal knowledge are insufficient to raise
genuine issues of material fact.”).  That alone should result in a vacated order. See Cunningham,
161 Idaho at 702.
At any rate, Ms. Bolland’s testimony that she had “do[ne] the math” is not sufficient
evidence to prove the total sum she calculated represents the State’s actual losses.  She did not,
as  the  Idaho  Supreme  Court  (like  so  many  math  teachers)  requires,  show  her  work. See
State v. Hurles, 158 Idaho 569, 577 (2015).  In Hurles, the State sought certain restitution based
on a spreadsheet prepared by a paralegal which collected the allegedly-relevant data and made
calculations based on that data. Id.   The  Idaho  Supreme  Court  vacated  the  portion  of  the
restitution award based on those calculations because “[t]here is no indication in the record as to
whether or how the spreadsheet prepared by the Givens Pursley paralegal relates to the [alleged
losses].” Id.  The district court in this case relied on that same sort of conclusory calculation, as
all the State provided was an administrative assistant’s compilation of allegedly-relevant but
unverified data and her calculations based on that data without showing whether or how that data
is actually related to the losses claimed.
The State’s failure to show its work in this case is particularly problematic under
I.C. § 37-2732(k) because that statute only authorizes the State to recover “the costs of
prosecution, including regular salaries.”  By using the term “regular salaries,” the plain language
of the statute reveals the Legislature limited the scope of the costs the State could recover.
See, e.g., Local 1494 of Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Couer d’Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 639-40
(1978); compare I.C. § 59-1302(31) (drawing a distinction between “salary” and “benefits” by
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defining “compensation” as “salary and benefits for the professional employee,” and “benefits”
as “employee insurance, leave and sick benefits”).
That limitation is consistent with the purpose of restitution, which is to address only the
losses caused by the defendant’s criminal conduct, not every out-of-pocket expense potentially
linked to the criminal conduct. See, e.g., State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct. App. 2012).
While the cost for the hours the prosecutor actually spent working on this case might be said to
be directly attributable to the criminal conduct, the costs for the bonuses, benefits, and such are
not paid because the prosecutor worked on this particular case, and so, the latter are not “caused
by” the criminal conduct in this case, which means they are not properly included in a restitution
order. State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37 (Ct. App. 2002) (explaining that courts cannot award
restitution for losses which are not specifically authorized by the Legislature); cf. Cunningham,
161 Idaho at 702 (noting that the statute requires the State to prove the loss it “actually
incurred”).
In  this  case,  the  State’s  evidence  does  not  show  its  claim  for  restitution  fits  under  the
scope of I.C. § 37-2732(k).  As trial counsel pointed out, without the State showing its work, it
has not shown that the pay rates it used represented the prosecutors’ regular salaries, as opposed
to being inflated by bonuses, benefits, or other additional costs.  (Tr., p.13, L.16 - p.14, L.5.)  As
such, the district court’s order, which relies on the State’s insufficient showing, is not based on
substantial, admissible evidence showing the restitution requested is appropriate under the
applicable statute.
In fact, by assessing the numbers the State did provide, it appears its calculations were
improperly inflated.  For example, taking the total amount requested and dividing by the total
number of hours claimed reveals the State’s calculations were based on an average pay rate of
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$56 per hour for the prosecutors involved.4  A person making $56 per hour would have a yearly
salary of $116,480.5  For comparison, a magistrate judge was only making $109,300 during the
time this case was proceeding, and the district court judge only $114,300.6  Thus,  the  State’s
numbers seem abnormally high.  As such, the numbers the State did provide do not appear to
reflect the prosecutors’ actual regular salaries, and thus, the actual loss suffered by the State in
this case. See I.C. § 37-2732(k).
Since the State did not present evidence, much less substantial evidence, as to the actual
rates of pay, and thus, its actual loss as provided in the applicable statute, the district court’s
decision to award restitution based on the State’s insufficient showing ignores the Idaho
Supreme Court clear instructions for the remand. See Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 700-02.
Therefore, the district court’s order should be vacated again.
E. The  Proper  Remedy  Is  To  Simply  Vacate  The  Restitution  Award  Without  Further
Remand
This is the second time the State has failed to present sufficient evidence in support of its
claim for restitution in this case. See Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 702.  In such circumstances,
“remanding for a third opportunity would be improper.” Nelson, 161 Idaho at 697.  Therefore,
4 $906.75 ÷ 16 hours = $56/hour.  (See Exh., pp.2-4.)
5 $56/hour * 40 hours/week * 52 weeks/year = $116,480/year.
6 The statues setting the salary schedule for judges were heavily amended in 2014.  Prior to that
change, and thus, during the relevant time for this case, the district court judge’s salary was
statutorily set at $114,300 per year. See 2014 Idaho Laws Ch. 291 (amending that language out
of I.C. § 59-502(1)).  A magistrate who was an attorney was scheduled to make $5,000 less than
a district judge.  I.C. § 1-2222 (2013), available at https://law.justia.com/codes/idaho/2013/title-
1/chapter-22/section-1-2222/; see 2014 Idaho Laws Ch. 291 (repealing I.C. § 1-2222 and moving
the magistrate pay schedule to I.C. § 59-502).   Thus, to compute what the magistrate’s salary
would have been, $114,300 - $5,000 = $109,300.
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this Court should, as the Idaho Supreme Court did in Nelson, simply vacate the restitution award
in this case without remanding it.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Cunningham respectfully requests this Court vacate the restitution order in his case.
DATED this 23rd day of January, 2018.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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